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Abstract 
Emissions trading schemes have great potential to lower pollution while minimizing 
compliance costs for firms in many areas now subject to traditional command-and-control 
regulation. This paper connects experience with emissions trading, from programs like the 
U.S. Acid Rain program, to lessons for implementation of a Trading Pilot Scheme in India. 
This experience suggests that four areas are especially important for successful 
implementation of an emissions trading scheme: setting the cap, allocating permits, 
monitoring and compliance. The introduction of emissions trading would position India as a 
clear leader in environmental regulation amongst emerging economies. 
 
I.  Introduction to Emissions Trading 
 An emissions trading scheme is a regulatory tool used to reduce pollution emissions at 
a low overall cost.  In such a scheme, the regulator sets the overall amount of emissions but 
does not decide what any particular source will emit.  Industrial plants and other polluters, 
rather than being told a fixed emissions limit, face a price for their emissions and choose how 
much to emit, within reasonable limits, taking this price into account.  The price of emissions 
makes pollution costly and gives polluters an incentive to cut back.  
 Emissions trading schemes have great potential to lower pollution while minimizing 
costs for industries.  The benefits of such schemes come from two sources.  On the industry 
side, units are able to choose for themselves the cheapest way to reduce pollution.  In 
comparison, traditional command-and-control regulations do not allow for differences across 
industries.  Mandating the same standard everywhere will generally miss the best 
opportunities for abatement.  On the regulatory side, an emissions trading scheme, once 
established, will provide a self-regulating system that that makes pollution control more 
efficient.  In the longer run, the reduced costs of compliance can also make it easier to 
introduce new regulations that increase environmental quality. 
 Past experience with emissions trading, discussed in more detail in Section III, has 
shown that cap-and-trade is a robust way to achieve targeted reductions in emissions at a low 
cost.  Figure 1 shows total emissions of sulfur dioxide under the U.S. Acid Rain program.  
Total emissions, shown by the black bars, fell sharply in 1995, the first year the emissions 
cap was introduced, and remained beneath the emissions cap, shown by the gray bars, 
thereafter.  Units in fact over-complied at the start, which has been attributed to cautious 
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market participants achieving emissions reductions more easily than anticipated through the 
adoption of cleaner fuels. (Schmalansee, 1998) 
 
Figure 1: Total Emissions in the U.S. Acid Rain Program, 1980—1999 
The cap-and-trade scheme sharply reduced emissions in its first year, 1995 
 
Source:  EPA (2009c). 
 This paper connects experience with emissions trading, from programs like the U.S. 
Rain program, to lessons for implementation of a Trading Pilot Scheme in India.  This 
experience suggests that four areas are especially important for successful implementation of 
an emissions trading scheme. 
• Setting the Cap.  The target for aggregate emissions from the sector where trading is 
introduced must be set to produce reasonable prices and emissions reductions. 
• Allocating Permits. The permits to emit must be distributed in an equitable way to 
build support for the scheme.  In many successful cases this allocation has been made 
for free relative to baseline emissions, greatly reducing the cost of compliance for 
industries. 
• Monitoring.  The quantity of emissions from each industrial plant must be reliably 
and continuously monitored with high integrity recognized by all sides. 
• Compliance.  The regulatory framework must make industries confident that buying 
permits is the only reliable way to meet environmental obligations.  
  
 Figure 2 shows the place of these key components within the overall structure of an 
emissions trading scheme.  The figure shows how emissions trading changes the role of the 
regulator.  Rather than fixing emissions at the level of the individual polluting unit, the 
regulator sets an amount of overall emissions, which are what matter for environmental 
quality, and allocates these emissions amongst units in the form of permits.  Units can then 
trade this right to emit.  Trading does not change the overall cap but allows the required 
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emissions reductions to be achieved by those units that can cut emissions at the lowest cost.  
At the end of each permit period the regulator checks emissions against permit holdings to 
verify compliance.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mechanics of an Emissions Trading Scheme 
Regulator ensures compliance but does not fix emissions for each source 
The introduction of emissions trading would position India as a clear leader in 
environmental regulation amongst emerging economies.  The benefits of a trading scheme 
will extend beyond the immediate goal of achieving compliance at a lower cost to society.  
Having a trading scheme in place will make it easier to adjust regulation as environmental 
goals change.  Tighter environmental standards can be achieved with a drop in the level of 
the cap, which would raise the price of emissions permits and give incentives to pollute less, 
rather than abruptly throwing certain areas or sources out of compliance.   
India may also benefit by tying the system for local emissions trading to global emissions 
trading schemes for carbon dioxide.  A successful cap-and-trade system will establish the 
infrastructure needed for putting a price on carbon dioxide as well as local pollutants, 
positioning the country to easily receive payments for the contribution of its innovative 
regulations to reducing greenhouse-gas emissions.  The European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme, Kyoto protocol and future carbon mitigation policies outlined under the Copenhagen 
Accord will generate demand for such reductions.  An emissions trading system to meet this 
demand would generate a net flow of foreign investment and reward the Indian economy for 
growing along a green path. 
The next section, Section II, on the Key Components of an Emissions Trading 
Scheme, discusses the areas introduced in Figure 2 in greater detail, to show what decisions 
affect the design of a trading scheme and to guide these decisions in the Indian context.  
Section III presents the next steps needed to move from a concept note to a workable plan for 
implementation of emissions trading.  Section IV presents some relevant cross-country 
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experience with emissions trading to place the discussion and recommendations from prior 
sections in the rich context of lessons from existing schemes. 
II.  Key Components of an Emissions Trading Scheme 
 This section relates past emissions trading-programs, which are reviewed in section 
IV, to the pre-requisites for implementing local trading for air pollutants in Indian states.  In 
each subsection, indicated by capital letters, bold-faced headings indicate a point of action 
where MoEF and participating SPCBs need to set a priority or make a decision.  The 
background information regarding each decision is provided below these points.   
A. Purpose.   
Targeted pollutants.  Select air pollutant(s) that require reduction in participating 
areas, have adequate monitoring technology and are emitted by a group of large point 
sources.   
 The purpose of the ETS is assumed to be the reduction of emissions of some 
conventional air pollutant, such as SO2, NOX or SPM, for the betterment of human health and 
the reduction of compliance costs.  The pollutants to be regulated will best be determined by 
a consideration of the goals and problems of the SPCB, as well as market design 
considerations such as the number of large sources and the ease of monitoring.  Markets with 
many large sources and better monitoring will generally function more smoothly 
B.  Emissions Cap. 
Setting the emissions cap is a key decision in establishing a cap-and-trade system.  
The cap must be neither so high that the system does not achieve reductions nor so low as to 
be prohibitively costly to firms.  We present two primary options: using baseline emissions to 
set the cap or using a targeted or desired level of level of ambient pollution.  Both ways 
require data on baseline emissions from the included units.  The second way additionally 
requires information on the local sources of air pollution and the relation between emissions 
and ambient concentrations.  Note that setting the overall emissions cap is a distinct question 
from how to allocate emissions permits under that cap, which is considered later. 
Baseline emissions.  Set emissions cap at the level of historical baseline emissions or 
at some arbitrary reduction (e.g. 25%) below this level.   
Most every market-based system to date has, to differing degrees, based total 
emissions on a historical baseline.  The monitoring system needed for trading can be used 
prior to the creation of the permit market to set baseline emissions.   
The primary difficulties with this method are making sure that baselines are accurate 
and that the process of determining baselines does not itself create any incentive to pollute.  
Caps set on historic baselines must not relate to decisions by units today about how much to 
emit.  For example, it would introduce distortions to announce, prior to baseline monitoring, 
that this monitoring was to be used to set emissions levels in the future.  In that case, units 
would have an incentive to emit more today in order to increase their allocation.   
Ambient targets.  Set emissions cap at the level projected to achieve a desired 
reduction in ambient pollutant concentrations. 
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As an example of this method, suppose that industry is responsible for 50% of 
particulate emissions and transport the other 50%.  The current total level of emissions is 100 
tonnes and it is estimated that emissions of 60 tonnes would yield the desired ambient level of 
air quality.  Then the cap introduced for industry would be 30, a reduction of 20 from the 
baseline level. 
The benefit of setting ambient concentrations with this method is that it has sound 
public policy support.  The goal of pollution regulation is to benefit the public at large and it 
is therefore fitting to set broad targets based on ambient standards.  Moreover, the NAAQS 
are well established and a clear way to measure progress towards the end goal of market 
schemes. 
The main problem with this method is that it can be difficult to link emissions to 
various sources and to ambient pollution concentrations.  The Central Pollution Control 
Board (CPCB), however, will have most of the information needed to enable this linkage, 
such as ambient pollution data and source apportionment studies, that measure what share of 
air pollution is due to various sources, such as transport, industry, power generation, cooking 
fires or dust.  The Central Pollution Control Board initiated such source apportionment 
studies for particulate matter less than then ten nanometers in diameter (PM10) in the cities of 
Delhi, Bangalore, Pune, Mumbai, Chennai and Kanpur in 2007-08. 
Safeguards.  Set additional parameters, such as hard caps or other limits on high-
frequency emissions, that prevent local accumulation of pollutants. 
The overall emissions cap is not the only regulatory parameter to be set.  In addition, 
most market-based systems overlap with hard limits meant to prevent the accumulation of 
pollutants in one location.  Experience with emissions trading has not shown any tendency 
for this to occur, but this hard cap may be an important safeguard for pollutants like SO2 or 
particulates where local hot spots will be associated with adverse health effects. 
Price ceiling.  Commit to the government selling permits if the price rises too high. 
In addition to providing safeguards against the concentration of pollutants, the market 
system can also be designed to ensure industry that compliance will not be overly costly.  The 
regulator accomplishes this goal by committing to sell additional permits, raising the overall 
cap, if the price of a permit rises above a fixed ceiling.  This ceiling can be raised over time 
when it becomes clear that the cap has set a reasonable overall pollution target and the market 
is functioning well. 
C.  Implementation. 
Free Allocation of Permits.  Supply permits for free to units based on some fixed 
formula, usually in proportion to baseline emissions. 
In most permit markets to date emission permits have initially been distributed free.  
This free distribution has been the case in all of the markets considered in detail below.  The 
primary benefits to this method are that it allows for industry buy-in and is therefore easy to 
implement.  As plants will have invested in their capacity prior to the new regulation it may 
also be fair to compensate them for the regulatory change. 
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The cost of this method is direct, in denying revenues to SPCBs that could otherwise 
sell permits to raise money for continuous monitoring or other operations, and indirect, in 
somewhat compromising the polluter pays principle honored by Indian environmental law.   
Auctioning permits.  SPCB or other authority conducts an auction of the total 
volume of permits decided under the cap. 
The advantages to this method are the exact converse of the costs noted above.  
Auctioning permits raises revenue for the implementation of regulations or other purposes 
and ensures that firms responsible for emissions bear the full cost of these emissions.   
Several other points are important for the allocation decision.  Auctions and give-
aways are not mutually exclusive.  The EPA used both in the Acid Rain program, wanting 
auctions not for reasons of fairness but to ensure liquidity in the permit market. 
Setting the overall cap and distributing permits to realize this cap are distinct 
decisions.  The cap could be based on an ambient target but unit-level allocations may still 
made in proportion to baseline emissions.  Alternatively, the overall cap could be set based 
on the sum of unit baseline emissions but the permits auctioned off. 
In the broadest economic terms the efficiency of the emissions market does not 
depend on the initial allocation of permits.  This idea, founded on the theoretical work of 
Ronald Coase that was recognized with a Nobel Prize in Economics, is supported by 
evidence from the United States. (Fowlie and Perloff, 2008)  The initial allocation, however, 
matters greatly for acceptance of the program by both industry and concerned citizens. 
D.  Trading. 
The main considerations to design a trading system will be what the nature of the 
permit itself will be and how the permit holdings of participants will be tracked.   
Permit quantity and duration.  Decide the unit of pollution that permits represent 
and the period of their validity. 
The nature of the permit itself can be very important.  The permit should be a 
commodity with a value that industry can easily measure to encourage trading.  The U.S. 
example of a permit being equivalent to 1 tonne of SO2 is a good benchmark.  Permits are 
based on the total quantity of emissions, rather than their concentration.   
Permits also have a time duration.  Allowing a longer duration, such as a whole year, 
may reduce uncertainly by letting units adjust to their emissions.  Emissions markets must 
have periodic true-up points, say for example every year or half-year.  At these points, plants 
are required to hand over to the regulator permits for every unit of pollution emitted since the 
last true-up point.  The duration of the permit can also be matched to pollution goals.  The 
U.S. NOX budget program only operates in the summer when ozone pollution is worst.  The 
equivalent in the Indian context might be separate pollution permits for the winter and non-
winter seasons to adjust to different damages caused by urban pollution at those times. 
Some markets, such as that for SO2 in the United States, allow permits to be used over 
periods as long as several years.  Allowing permits to be used over longer periods generally 
lowers the total costs of compliance, because firms can choose to emit more in periods when 
the costs of abatement are low and less when they are higher (e.g., during an economic 
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boom).  On the other hand, the greater the time duration of a permit, the greater the chance 
that firms will lobby to be granted extra permits that ultimately break the cap.  At the 
beginning of a trading scheme, when the right level of the emissions cap is uncertain, permits 
should have limited validity so that a cap that is too high does not allow high emissions to 
spill-over into the future. 
Set up a permit market.  Create an exchange system that sets clear prices and 
enables easy trading. 
The liquidity of the market refers to how easy permits are to buy and sell.  Units 
looking to buy or sell permits should be able to easily and inexpensively determine the 
market price and be able to conduct transactions at that price at a low cost.  The design of the 
permit itself, as discussed, will affect the liquidity of the market, as will the size of the market 
itself.  If a greater number of units is participating it is more likely that buyers and sellers can 
promptly find one another so that each may hold permits in accordance with their needs.  In a 
small market, the pollution authority may want to guarantee some measure of liquidity by 
offering to sell permits at a high price.  With this offer units can know that their costs for 
emissions will never exceed a certain limit. 
E. Monitoring.   
Monitoring is the foundation for any trading system.  The accurate, comprehensive 
monitoring of total emissions in the U.S. Sulfur Dioxide program helped ensure the 
transparency and success of the permit market 
Monitoring.  Establish a monitoring protocol that accurately and continuously 
monitors total pollutant emissions and provides clear procedures in case of data gaps. 
With current technology continuous monitoring is costly but generally accurate for a 
range of pollutants, including SO2, NOX and to a somewhat lesser extent, particulate matter.  
Continuous monitoring of all affected units, along the lines of the Tamil Nadu Pollution 
Control Board’s CARE Air Centre, must be in place to support trading.  This monitoring 
should cover not only pollutant concentrations but also the volume of gas flow, so that 
trading can be based on aggregate pollutant emissions rather than concentrations.  
Monitoring is not only a technology but also a system for filling gaps in that 
technology and recording emissions levels.  The monitoring protocol should specify how 
frequently continuous emissions monitoring equipment will be inspected and what the 
consequences are in case of tampering or incomplete data.  Following the sulfur dioxide 
market in the U.S., good practice will be to assume the worst, or near to it, when emissions 
data is incomplete. 
F.  Outcomes. 
Evaluation.  Track the progress of the emissions trading system through emissions, 
permit market functioning, and the reduction in costs to firms themselves. 
The obvious and immediate outcome of emissions has been discussed throughout.  An 
important additional outcome will be the cost of compliance for participating firms.  By 
conducting industry surveys during a monitoring-only stage and after the introduction of the 
permit market, which may be phased in over time, one can measure the cost of compliance 
and the total benefits to emissions trading more completely than has been done for any of the 
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above schemes.  These measurements will help to find Indian sectors where emissions trading 
will have the greatest bang for the regulatory buck in the future.  
III.  Next Steps Towards Development of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu Schemes 
A.  State Level. 
 To provide specific guidance on how the considerations above can be put into practice 
to reduce pollution emissions in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, we will shortly begin dialogue with 
the Gujarat Pollution Control Board and Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board to understand 
their goals, past data and capabilities with respect to local air pollution.  These states contain 
critically polluted areas with many large industries that would be suitable for an emissions 
trading pilot.  TNPCB, moreover, has already begun a continuous emissions monitoring 
program, one of the prerequisites for emissions trading.  The outcome of this dialogue will be 
a clear working plan to implement emissions trading. 
A Trading Pilot Scheme evaluation can be conducted in one or two states to 
demonstrate a workable model that addresses all of the areas discussed in this note.  A robust 
evaluation design will allow direct comparison of the levels of pollution emissions achieved 
under command-and-control and trading systems, to answer to environmental concerns, and 
of the cost of compliance, to answer to industry.  Experience with market trading has 
suggested that costs under the permit scheme will be lower than under traditional regulation.  
An evaluation can convincingly show this to be the case and thereby build support and a 
knowledge base for the wider application of emissions trading schemes. 
A.  At the Center. 
 The Ministry of Environment and Forests, on its side, must investigate the changes 
required for the existing legal system of pollution regulation to enable emissions trading. A 
supportive regulatory framework will establish the legal connection between emissions 
trading and existing law.  Industries must know that permits do indeed meet compliance 
obligations to accept the trading scheme.    
  The important questions that the Ministry will need to address to provide a framework 
for emissions trading are: 
 
• What legal changes are necessary in order for units to be subject to pollution permits, 
rather than existing emissions norms? 
 
• How will the permits be allocated and what will be the legal rights and obligations of 
permit holders? 
 
• Who will bear the costs for monitoring equipment and of central resources, such as 
software for tracking emissions and trades?  This expense could be funded from the 
auctioning of some share of permits. 
 
• What are the national goals of this program?  How will city- or state-level programs 
be integrated in the future to create more robust markets? 
The introduction of this Trading Pilot Scheme can serve as a model for future 
environmental regulation in India and also position industry to benefit from potential tie-ups 
to global emissions trading schemes, as for carbon dioxide.  Introducing emissions trading 
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would make India a clear leader in environmental regulation amongst emerging economies.  
Market-based schemes lower compliance cost and provide a powerful, flexible tool to 
respond to a wide range of pollution problems.  A successful cap-and-trade system will have 
the additional benefit of allowing India to easily receive payments for the contribution of its 
environmental regulations to reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. 
IV.  Experience with Emissions Trading to Date 
The rationale for emissions trading is always the same—reducing the cost of reaching 
some targeted level of pollution.  Societies usually care not who emits pollutants but only 
about the total of their emissions.  By fixing this total and allowing trade between different 
firms for the right to pollute a certain share, cap-and-trade schemes allow firms with cheaper 
ways to reduce emissions to achieve more of the overall reductions.  This trade therefore 
lowers the overall cost of meeting the pollution target.  Put bluntly, it streamlines regulation 
and saves firms money while also protecting the environment. 
The application of cap-and-trade pollution markets has been very successful in 
practice, achieving the desired reductions in emissions reliably and at lower-than-expected 
cost.  This section briefly considers three different emissions trading schemes for three 
different air pollutants that have been implemented in different countries.  The purpose of the 
discussion is to bring out the important aspects of the design and implementation of each 
scheme to provide some background for the issues discussed in section I. 
A.  Sulfur Dioxide, United States.  An extremely successful trading scheme that 
reduced sulfur dioxide emissions and the related acid rain problem at a surprisingly low cost 
to firms. 
Purpose.  The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments established the first large-scale 
system to reduce pollution through tradable emissions permits.  (Schmalensee et al., 1998)  
The purpose of the program was to reduce emissions of SO2 from power plants to stop acid 
rain and for this reason it is also sometimes known as the Acid Rain program.  The overall 
goal of the program was a reduction in annual SO2 emissions by 10 million tons below 1980 
levels. 
Emissions Cap.  The emissions cap in this program was set at about half of the level 
of emissions from the same set of power plants in 1980, beginning in 1995.  Phase I subjected 
only the 263 dirtiest power plants in 21 states to the cap and Phase II, beginning in the year 
2000, applied to over 2,000 fossil-fuel burning electric generating units, virtually all such 
units in the United States.  Each participating unit is required to hold an amount of permits, or 
allowances, at least equal to its annual emissions.  If a plant emits 5,000 tons of SO2, it must 
hold 5,000 permits to do so.  Regardless of the number of permits a plant holds, it may not 
exceed upper limits set by the same act to protect public health.  (Environment Protection 
Agency, 2009a) 
The overall level of emissions was set on a per-unit basis based on baseline heat input 
of the electricity-generating units.  Permits were allocated for each year beginning in 1995. 
The EPA allocated allowances at an emission rate of 2.5 pounds of SO2/mmBtu (million 
British thermal units) of heat input, multiplied by the unit's baseline mmBtu (the average 
fossil fuel consumed from 1985 through 1987). 
Implementation.  Existing generating units were given, free, a number of permits 
based on the formula above at the beginning of the program.  Note that the determination of 
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the cap and the allocation of the units are in principle separate; the EPA could have set the 
overall cap using the formula above but then allocated permits using an auction. 
Trading.  After the initial allocation, new units or units needing additional permits 
could obtain them from two sources: purchasing from other or at auctions run by the EPA.  
The purpose of the auctions was to provide clear information about prices, but in practice 
most trading occurred privately. 
 Trading enables units to achieve emissions reductions at low cost without changing 
the overall level of pollution set by the cap.  Figure 2 compares the sulfur dioxide emissions 
rates for each polluting source under the trading scheme, as shown by the vertical gray bars, 
to the emissions rates likely for each unit without trading, as shown by the heavy black line.  
Many units have actual emissions rates higher or lower than they would have been under a 
fixed emissions standard, indicating that units used the flexibility of emissions trading to 
achieve compliance at a low cost.  For some units, the best way to comply is to reduce 
emissions directly, for others it is to pay for the right to emit more by buying credits 
from units that were able to abate emissions at a lower cost.  The price of emissions 
urged each unit to seek out low-cost means of abatement while the cap ensured that overall 
emissions fell, as Figure 1 showed above.  
 
Figure 3: Emissions Trading in the U.S. Acid Rain Program, 1996 
Trading allows low-cost abatement without changing the overall emissions cap 
 
Unit Serial Number, ordered from Lowest Emissions Rate to Highest 
Source: Schmalansee et al. (1998), derived from Pechan (1995), EPA’s EMS and EPA (1996) 
 Monitoring.  Emissions are monitored continuously at affected units, at an average 
annual cost of $124,000.  Continuous emissions monitoring is an essential foundation for 
trading, which requires that every ton of unit emissions be recorded.  Units required to 
monitor SO2 emissions in pounds per hour must use both an SO2 pollutant concentration 
monitor and a volumetric flow monitor.  Both concentration and flow are required because 
the permit applies to the total mass of the pollutant emitted.  In addition to this basic 
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equipment the unit must have a data acquisition and handling system (DAHS) to process and 
record readings.  The monitoring protocol includes conservative formulas for filling-in 
missing data that penalize units for monitoring downtime. The EPA also has monitoring 
protocols for NOX and CO2 emissions. 
The number of permits held by each unit is tracked in an Allowance Management 
System (AMS).  Parties may trade permits privately but must notify the EPA when permits 
acquired through these trades are going to be used to cover emissions.  Affected units must 
deliver to the EPA valid permits sufficient to cover a year’s emissions by 1 March of the year 
following.   
If a unit does not have enough permits it must surrender any permits for the following 
year as excess emission offsets and pay a penalty for the present year’s excess. (Federal 
Register, 1997)  The penalty is the number of excess tons emitted times a base fine of $2,000 
per ton, an excess charge that is adjusted annually for inflation.  The excess charge for 1997 
was $2,525 per ton.  As permit prices in this year were little above $100 per ton the excess 
charge is enormous and in practice all units complied by holding sufficient permits. 
Outcomes. The effect of the program was a large reduction in emissions at a lower 
cost than anticipated.  In 1995, the first year of the program, total emissions fell from 8 
million tons to less than 5 million tons.  Generating units achieved these reductions by using 
lower-sulfur coal and by using scrubbers to remove SO2 from stack gases. The estimated 
savings to firms from using a trading scheme instead of fixed regulations was around $225 
million to $374 million per year. (Ellerman et al., 1997) 
B.  Total Suspended Particulates, Chile.  An inconsistently implemented trading 
scheme that nonetheless may have helped push firms to use cleaner fuels.  
Purpose.  The Emissions Offsets Trading Program was introduced in 1992 to reduce 
airborne particulate emissions from stationary industrial sources in Santiago, Chile.  
(Montero and Sanchez, 2002)  Standards for particulate matter less than 10 nanometers in 
diameter (PM10) had been consistently exceeded in Santiago since the 1970s and these high 
levels have been related to mortality and respiratory disease.  (Ostro et al., 1999)  
Emissions Cap.  At the time the regulation was issued existing sources received daily 
emissions rights in proportion to a pre-determined baseline emissions rate that was uniform 
across existing sources.  The Program aimed to reduce emissions by 80%, a figure chosen to 
achieve daily ambient air-quality standards 95% of the time.  The cap applied to sources with 
a flow rate greater than 1,000 m3 per hour, of which there were a total of 680 in 1993.   
Both existing and new sources are subject to a maximum cap that cannot be exceeded 
regardless of the number of permits held by that source.  This overall cap was usually about 
twice the level of emissions permits granted a source.  In addition, large stationary sources 
were liable to be shut down during episodes of severe ambient air quality, again regardless of 
the number of permits held.   
Implementation.  Existing sources were granted emissions permits free and in 
perpetuity, or “grandfathered” in.  Any new sources arising after the program began were 
obligated to purchase rights from existing sources.  This difference made the introduction of 
the program very successful in getting existing but unknown point sources to identify 
themselves in order to secure emissions rights.  Because unknown sources emerged to secure 
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rights, however, and rights were based on a per-unit emissions capacity formula, the overall 
cap ended up less stringent than expected. 
Trading.  Rights to emit are based on annual reviews of capacity.  Therefore the only 
requirement is that at the time of this annual monitoring the unit holds enough capacity rights 
to cover its current capacity.  In practice, trading was relatively thin—not many emissions 
capacity rights changed hands.  This low trading is an indication that the market did not 
realize its full potential for cost savings, as capacity rights have stayed with their initial 
holders, which may not be the firms to which these rights are most valuable.  Low trading 
appears to have been a reaction to uncertainty about future regulations and transactions costs 
in the permit market. 
Monitoring.  The authorities monitored not aggregate emissions but emissions 
capacity, which was estimated based on field visits to measure source size and fuel type.  
This is a rough estimate of the potential to produce emissions, which may serve better for 
particulate matter than for other pollutants, but does not allow for the ability to reduce 
emissions via better combustion control or other channels that do not change capacity but 
may reduce emissions.  Another limitation of this monitoring method is that it excludes 
process sources that produce emissions but are not comparable in terms of capacity to boilers.  
That is, the emissions capacity of each unit is based on estimated flow volume and a uniform 
emissions concentration quota, but no such quota could be applied to diverse industrial 
process sources, limiting the scope of the system.  For these reasons it is preferable, with 
modern technology, to monitor aggregate pollutant emissions directly. 
Outcomes.  Total TSP capacity (not emissions per se) was below the number of 
capacity rights by 1997.  Industry switched to cleaner fuels, such as natural gas, during this 
period, which appears responsible for most of the decline.  There are not good estimates of 
the cost of these changes but it seems that the establishment of the permit system accelerated 
this switch and created a response from gas supply.   
C.  Carbon Dioxide, European Union.  A well-functioning scheme that established 
thriving markets for carbon and reduced emissions but may have set initial emissions too 
high. 
Purpose.  The European Union introduced a CO2 emissions trading scheme, the EU 
ETS, starting in 2005 in order to limit emissions of carbon dioxide that contribute to global 
climate change.  The scheme applies to all EU member states and, within these states, to 
companies that generate electricity or are in energy-intensive industrial sectors.  
Emissions Cap.  As the EU ETS is an international program the allocation process 
was conducted at the level of each country.  Each member country was responsible for 
developing a National Action Plan (NAP), subject to review by the European Commission, 
that details the quantity of emissions each state expects and how it will allocate its permits to 
individual emitting units.  Unit-level allocations were typically based on historical emissions 
and covered a total of about 12,000 units emitting 46% of the EU total CO2 emissions.  
(Robinson and Watanabe, 2005) 
EU member states collected emissions data on years up to 2004 to establish NAPs 
that set expectations for what emissions would be over 2005-2007 and were used for 
allocating permits to the units included in the scheme.  This data was largely supplied 
voluntarily by facilities that would be receiving allocations and therefore had an incentive to 
distort emissions upwards.  (Buchner and Ellerman, 2009)   There was no single, Europe-
13 
wide allocation target and member states tended to allocate to their own units generously 
relative to both historical emissions and Kyoto protocol targets.  (Azar et al., 2005) 
Implementation.  The scheme was implemented in two phases with the expectation 
that additional phases would follow.  The first phase ran from 2005-2007 and the second 
from 2009-2012.  Member states were required to give away 95% of the permit allocations 
during the first phase and 90% during the second phase to units free of charge. 
Trading.  The market for permits to emit carbon dioxide has been open and active 
since its inception.  Carbon prices have generally ranged from about €10-30 with 
considerable movement in that range.  Not only units but also many third-parties participate 
in the carbon market, and permits from the Kyoto protocol, which represent reductions in 
carbon emissions from outside the EU, are to some extent tradeable with the EU ETS as well. 
Monitoring. Units registering for permits are required to have a system to monitor and 
record emissions in place.  During the scheme, units are then required to surrender enough 
permits by 30 April of each year to cover emissions from the previous year.  Units that do not 
have enough permits have to pay an excess emissions penalty of €40 per tonne of CO2 during 
the first phase of the scheme and €100 per tonne in the second phase.  These penalties 
constituted big premiums over prevailing prices during the first years of the scheme. 
Outcomes.  The EU ETS lowered carbon emissions about 3.4% below the business-
as-usual case. (Buchner and Ellerman, 2008)  Emissions trading within and across countries 
did a good job in matching units with excess allocations to those with deficits. (Ellerman and 
Trotignon, 2008)  Initial allocation targets were generous, but the positive emissions price 
indicates the system did have bite and will work to achieve further reductions in the future. 
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Emissions Trading Schemes: Cross-Country Experience 
Country Program Commodity Period Outcomes 
Canada ODS Allowance Trading CFCs and Methyl 
Chloroform 
1993-1996 Low trading volume except 
among large methyl bromide 
allowance holders 
 ODS Allowance Trading HCFCs 1996- 
 ODS Allowance Trading Methly bromide 1995- 
 PERT NOX, VOCs, CO, 
CO2, SO2 
1996- Pilot program 
 GERT CO2 1997- Pilot program 
Chile Santiago Air Emissions 
Trading 
TSP emissions 
rights 
1995- Low trading volume; decrease in 
emissions since 1997 not 
definitively tied to system 
European 
Union 
ODS Quota System ODS Production 
Quotas under 
Montreal Protocol 
1991-1994 More rapid phaseout of ODS 
 EU Emissions Trading 
System 
CO2 2005- Large, active market and some 
reduction in emissions 
Singapore ODS Permit Trading Permits for use and 
distribution of ODS 
1991- Increase in permit prices; 
benefits unknown 
United 
States 
Emissions Trading 
Program 
Criteria air 
pollutants under the 
Clean Air Act
1974-
present 
Same environmental 
performance with $5-12 billion 
savings
 Leaded Gasoline 
Phasedown 
Rights for lead in 
gasoline among 
refineries
1982-87 Rapid phaseout of leaded 
gasoline and large savings 
 Water Quality Trading Point and non-point 
sources of nitrogen 
and phosphorous  
1984-86 No trading necessary because 
standards were not binding 
 CFC Trades for Ozone 
Protection 
Production rights for 
some CFCs 
1987- Environmental targets achieved 
ahead of schedule 
 Heavy Duty Engine 
Trading 
Credits for NOX and 
particulates 
1992- Standards achieved; cost savings 
unknown 
 Acid Rain Program SO2 emissions 
reduction credits 
1995- SO2 reductions ahead of schedule 
at savings of $1 billion per year 
 RECLAIM Program SO2 and NOX 
emissions 
1994- Over 50% reduction in pollution 
emissions at $60 million annual 
savings 
 NOX Budget Program NOX amongst large 
point sources 
1999- Targets met at 40-50% cost 
savings. 
Source: Stavins (2003) and Stavins (2007).
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